

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
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"Filling The Gaps"  
New Information Sources for Operational Commanders in Third World Countries

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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*The necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent and need not be further urged.  
General George Washington, 26 July 1776*

## SCENARIO

*On 9 August 2002, U.S. Secretary of State (SECSTATE) Colin Powell makes a statement to the UN general assembly that 100 members of Usama bin Laden's al Qaeda network are believed to be in Northwest Somalia in the region referred to as "Somaliland." The al Qaeda members are reported to be working with an unknown number of members of the Islamic terrorists group Al-Ittihad Al-Islam (AIAI) in the vicinity of Hargeysa, Somaliland. SECSTATE Powell tells the UN that this region will be the next area of operation (AO) for Operation Enduring Freedom. Meanwhile, the Commander in Chief (CINC) of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has tasked the First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) with establishing a Joint Task Force (JTF) to lead counter terrorism operations in Somalia.*

*Operational Planning. In conducting his mission analysis, the I MEF Commander determines he wants to land a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) in the port city of Berbera, but is concerned with the road network, particularly mine fields, in the 125 miles between Berbera and Hargeysa. Additionally, the Commander is concerned with the number of U.S. citizens in the AO in the event of escalation and the requirement to conduct a non-combatant evacuation (NEO).*

*Intelligence Gaps. A wide variety of technical collection intelligence platforms are readily available for I MEF. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) products are adequate, but available Human Intelligence (HUMINT) reports are dated. Intelligence gaps are identified in not being able to accurately assess the current road network infrastructure in Somaliland. The current disposition of U.S. citizens and how to contact them is also of concern to the Commander of I MEF. The I MEF staff generates requests for information (RFIs) which are forwarded to the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) at CENTCOM. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) offices responsible for Somalia are located in the American Embassy (AMEMBASSY) Ethiopia and recent reporting has focused on terrorists' activities in Mogadishu, located in Southern Somalia. This Embassy, located in Addis Ababa, is 450 miles away from the AO. The AMEMBASSY Djibouti has consular responsibilities for Somaliland and is closer, at 275 miles, but does not have CIA or DIA representatives resident there.*

*Information Sources. The Commander of I MEF sends a liaison officer to AMEMBASSY Djibouti to coordinate the logistical transfer of equipment from strategic airlift to MEU helicopters in support of the Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG – with MEU embarked) staging in the Gulf of Aden. Operating out of the AMEMBASSY, the liaison officer learns the Consular Officer recently returned from a trip to Hargeysa to update the Embassy's Somaliland F77 Report.<sup>1</sup> The liaison officer is also briefed on the large number*

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<sup>1</sup> The DOS F77 Report is a mandated DOS report, prepared by an Embassy Consular Officer, which lists the number of U.S. citizens residing in a Consular district. As part of the report, POCs, telephone numbers,

*of UN Agencies and International Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) operating in Somaliland (see Appendix A). Of particular interest, the liaison officer learns about a USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) program. Initiated in late 2000, this program was designed to bring in 728,200 metric tons (MT) of food assistance to feed starving Ethiopians.<sup>2</sup> The liaison officer finds a detailed assessment of the port facility in Berbera and the road network through Hargeysa to Ethiopia in a status report on the OFDA program. Additionally, a USAID officer at the embassy gives the liaison officer a copy of a Humanitarian De-mining (HD) report from the HALO Trust. HALO Trust is a NGO that received \$3.8 million from the U.S. Department of State (DOS) to conduct HD operations in Somaliland from July 1999 to February 2002.<sup>3</sup> This report contains a comprehensive landmine survey of Somaliland, including the area surrounding Hargeysa. Realizing the relevance of this information, the liaison officer forwards it to the JTF staff.*

*End Result. Evaluating the newly acquired information, the JTF staff is prompted to exploit additional open source information as well. This additional information fills other intelligence gaps and enables the staff to conduct a more thorough assessment of the AO. With a better intelligence estimate, the Commander is able to refine his course of action (COA). The result is reduced risk for the U.S. forces participating and increased efficiency for the overall operation.<sup>4</sup>*

## INTRODUCTION

*Know the culture and the issues. Who makes the decisions? Who has high status? We must be careful not to allow our own biases to take us to the intellectuals and the academics—the “darlings of the intelligence community”—who are likely to manipulate us. Often, the real decision makers are “at the back of the tent.” We must go to them.<sup>5</sup>*

*Former LtGen. Anthony Zinni, 1995*

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and addresses are included. This report is used in conjunction with a “Warden System” which is an established phone tree that allows the AMEMBASSY to contact U.S. citizens in the event of a national emergency. This information is most often used in the event of a Non-Combatant Evacuation (NEO).

<sup>2</sup> USAID, “Ethiopia: Complex Emergency and Drought,” 14 November 2001, <[http://www.usaid.gov/hum\\_response/ofda/00annual/ethiopia.html](http://www.usaid.gov/hum_response/ofda/00annual/ethiopia.html)> [11 January 2002].

<sup>3</sup> Institute for Practical Research and Training (IPR), “Somaliland,” 25 December 2001, <<http://www.iprt.org/somaliland%20LM2002.htm>> [13 January 2002].

<sup>4</sup> The 1 MEF/Hargeysa, Somalia example is a notional case to illustrate the relevance of open source information to an operational commander. Although the situation is hypothetical, the information products and their sources are real.

<sup>5</sup> Anne M. Dixon and Maureen A. Wigge (Editors), “CNA 1995 Annual Conference, ‘Proceedings’ Military Support to Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: From Practice to Policy,” (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1995), 19.

Operational commanders have received fewer HUMINT intelligence products for Third World<sup>6</sup> countries since the end of the Cold War in 1990. General Zinni (USMC, Retired) first addressed this issue in 1995 while speaking at the annual Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) conference. Based on his experiences in Somalia, he pointed out the negative consequences of military commanders not getting the intelligence they require to fully prepare for Third World operations. Since his statement in 1995, little has been done to rectify this problem. With post Cold War changes in U.S. intelligence priorities, many of the poorest countries are no longer on the collection list. Nowhere has this lack of reporting coverage had a greater impact than in Third World countries. The notional case example of “Somaliland” is provided to show the complexity of this issue, possible solutions, and its relevance to today’s operational commanders.

In the wake of the Cold War, the sudden cutoff of aid from the U.S. and the former Soviet Union has resulted in unstable governments in many Third World countries. As a result, these are the very countries where Humanitarian Assistance (HA) missions are most likely. Whether in support of HA or for a range of other reasons (Appendix B), U.S. operational commanders may now find themselves employed in support of U.S. interests in many of these developing countries. In Africa alone, the U.S. has conducted 24 contingency operations since 1990 (see Appendix C). Presently, Operation Enduring Freedom is sending U.S. commanders to many Third World countries to conduct counter terrorism operations.

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<sup>6</sup> Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 2001, <<http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary>> [20 January 2002]. Third World: (noun) 1. A group of developing nations, especially in Africa and Asia not aligned with either the Communist or the non-Communist blocs. 2. An aggregate of minority groups within a larger predominant culture. 3. The aggregate of the underdeveloped nations of the world.



According to *Global Trends 2015*,<sup>7</sup> a product prepared by the National Intelligence Council (NIC), this trend is likely to continue into the future.

Not all past military operations in Third World countries have gone well. The problems faced in Somalia alone highlight the increased need for better intelligence when conducting Third World operations. Because they are low intelligence priority countries, there are few resources to assist operational commanders in conducting the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB)<sup>8</sup> (see Appendix D for JIPB summary). In both deliberate<sup>9</sup> and crisis<sup>10</sup> action planning processes a thorough and continuing JIPB is critical to a Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES). Without accurate and reliable information, shortcomings in mission analysis are certain.

The leading cause of today's Third World intelligence gaps is the post-Cold War prioritization of the United States' overseas intelligence capabilities. The intelligence community shifted limited resources from Third World countries to new regions such as the former Soviet Union states. For operational commanders, the reduction in CIA stations and DIA Attaché offices in Third World countries has been critical. These two agencies provide

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<sup>7</sup> National Intelligence Council (NIC), *Global Trends 2015*, December 2000, <[http://www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/toc\\_nic\\_publications.htm](http://www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/toc_nic_publications.htm)> [21 January 2002].

<sup>8</sup> (JP 1-02) – An analytical methodology employed to reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, and terrain for all types of operations. JIPB builds an extensive database for each potential area in which a unit may be required to operate. The database is then analyzed in detail to determine the impact of the enemy, environment, and terrain on operations and presents it in graphic form. JIPB is a continuing process.

<sup>9</sup> (JP 1-02) – 1. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) process involving the development of joint operation plans for contingencies identified in joint strategic planning documents. Conducted principally in peacetime, deliberate planning is accomplished in prescribed cycles that complement other DOD planning cycles in accordance with the formally established Joint Strategic Planning System. 2. A planning process for the deployment and employment of apportioned forces and resources that occurs in response to a hypothetical situation. Deliberate planners rely heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that will exist when the plan is executed.

<sup>10</sup> (JP 1-02) – 1. The JOPES process involving the time-sensitive development of joint operation plans and orders in response to an imminent crisis. Crisis action planning (CAP) follows prescribed crisis action procedures to formulate and implement an effective response within the time frame permitted by the crisis. 2. The time-sensitive planning for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources that occur in response to a situation that may result in actual military operations. Crisis action planners base their plans on the circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs.

the majority of “ground truth” intelligence; with a reduced presence, information gaps are created by nonexistent or outdated intelligence. Alternative information sources such as those provided by United States Government (USG) agencies and NGOs can assist commanders in mitigating this intelligence shortfall.

USG AMEMBASSY country team personnel, along with NGO personnel and the organizations they represent, can fill intelligence gaps for operational commanders in Third World military operations. USG and NGO organizations working overseas are an overlooked source of relevant and timely information. Many of these organizations produce products that provide current, in-depth information on cultural or physical aspects of a given Third World country or region. These products have been overlooked in the past in favor of more sought after CIA and DIA intelligence reports.

The positive impact would be very significant if operational commanders were able to access these additional information products. Commanders could use these products to fill intelligence gaps identified in the planning process. This would equate to a more thorough and complete intelligence picture for conducting the CES and completing the JIPB. The end result would be a more efficient and effective military operation.

This paper analyzes how post-Cold War CIA/DIA priorities have caused intelligence gaps for operational commanders in Third World countries. An examination of the advantages of utilizing other USG and NGO information products to fill these gaps will be discussed. Finally, access problems to these products will be addressed in order to provide solutions for operational commanders requiring this information.

## ANALYSIS

### The Problem

Since the National Security Act of 1947, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has been the head of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC).<sup>11</sup> As such, the DCI is the principal intelligence advisor to the President and the principal in charge of the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP). While the DCI does not control the budgets of the other members of the IC, the NFIP program he presents to Congress annually determines the priorities for the IC organizations (which, in turn, influences their budgets). Additionally, there are two programs more narrowly focused and designed to support military forces that are funded separately in two programs within the Department of Defense (DOD). These programs are the Joint Military Intelligence Program and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities aggregation, which fall under control of the Deputy Secretary of Defense.<sup>12</sup>

Since the end of the Cold War in 1990, the IC, similar to DOD, has experienced a reduction in current-dollar operating budgets. This reduction in operating budgets has caused a shift in priorities as increased intelligence requirements compete with limited resources. To support U.S. national interests and operational commanders in Iraq, Bosnia, and Kosovo, the IC has had to reduce its presence elsewhere. This shift in presence has come at the expense of Third World countries, where operational commanders must now operate with reduced intelligence coverage.

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<sup>11</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, "United States Intelligence Community," February 1999, iii. "Intelligence Community" refers to those executive branch agencies and organizations that conduct a variety of intelligence activities which comprise the total U.S. national intelligence effort – the Office of the DCI; the CIA; the NSA; the DIA; the intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps; the NIMA; the National Reconnaissance Office; the intelligence elements of the FBI; The Department of Treasury; the Department of Energy; and the Department of State.

In Africa in 2002 there are only 23 DOD Defense Attaché offices covering 53 countries.<sup>13</sup> Although many of these offices report on multiple countries, by not having a resident Attaché, the timeliness, thoroughness, and relevance of this reporting is constrained. The result is limited DIA coverage and potential intelligence gaps in 30 African countries.

Operating under the same budgetary constraints, CIA Stations<sup>14</sup> have suffered a similar drawdown in Third World countries. Similar to DIA, a CIA Chief of Station may have multiple country and regional reporting responsibilities. Additionally, even in Third World countries where there is a CIA Station, if the host government is not part of the Station's reporting priorities (based on U.S. national priorities), reporting will focus on other topics.

Despite the post Cold-War reductions, the CIA and DIA do not always cover the other organization's gaps. AMEMBASSY missions without priority enough to receive a Defense Attaché office often have no CIA presence either. This fact magnifies the intelligence gaps for an operational commander. Of the 53 countries in Africa, 30 potentially have neither a resident DIA nor CIA reporting officer.

The danger of nonresident reporting is that it is based on one-time "snapshot" impressions by an officer usually while on travel. Reporting of this type often fails to adequately portray the volatility and fluidness of a Third World environment. A JIPB based solely on this intelligence may not highlight information of critical concern to the commander, causing a gap in operational intelligence in a given joint area of operation

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid., iii.

<sup>13</sup> Foreign Area Officer Home Page, 15 January 2002, <<http://www-perscom.army.mil/opfamos/>> [17 January 2002].

<sup>14</sup> A CIA Station may operate out of an overseas U.S. installation, with or without the knowledge of the host country. Garrett Jones, "Working with the CIA" in PARAMETERS, US Army War College Quarterly, VOL. XXXI, NO. 4, Winter 2001-02, 30.

(JOA). Presently, reporting gaps are in some of the most volatile countries in which operational commanders may find themselves operating (see Appendix E). Although these countries are low on the national intelligence priority list, commanders may be called on to conduct operations there in support of U.S. national interests.

The reluctance of operational commanders and their staffs to utilize open-source information is a contributing factor to the impact of intelligence gaps in the JIPB process. Joint Publication 2-0 doctrinally restricts operational staffs to the “stove-pipe” effect of the intelligence community when submitting RFIs. The operational commander’s joint intelligence support element (JISE) can forward an RFI to the joint intelligence center (JIC), which can forward it to the national military joint intelligence center (NMJIC), which can forward it to other agencies in the IC.<sup>15</sup> All of these organizations focus on intelligence products that have gone through a complete intelligence cycle.<sup>16</sup> Open source material by definition is unprocessed information. Although operational commanders should not rely solely on this type of information, it could provide relevant and timely information to fill in known or suspected intelligence gaps.

### The Solution

Not all USG organizations have drawn down in a similar way since the end of the Cold War. Unlike the IC which reduced personnel and closed offices in order to address new priorities, the DOS took a different approach. Faced with similar budget reductions throughout the 1990s, DOS chose to keep many overseas Embassies and Consulates open,

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<sup>15</sup> Intelligence Community – see footnote 9.

<sup>16</sup> Joint Publication 2-0, “Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations,” 9 March 2000, II-1. The Intelligence Cycle consists of planning and direction; collection; processing and exploitation; analysis and production; dissemination and integration; complete with evaluation and feedback.

but with reduced staffs and services. This was specifically the case in most Third World countries. By maintaining a diplomatic presence in Third World countries, DOS has been able to closely manage and monitor activities in those countries.

For example, in 2001 DOS had 45 diplomatic missions in Africa. This marks a sizable difference compared to the 23 countries with resident DIA offices. In addition to services provided to U.S. citizens living abroad, these missions are charged with the management of international engagement programs that protect and promote our collective national interests.

In the management of the multitude of U.S. and international programs abroad, AMEMBASSY missions have compiled extensive data files on all aspects of most Third World countries. Constant updating or “evergreening” is required to show past and predict future trends. Imbedded in these data files and reports are host-nation (HN) points of contact (POC), infrastructure and capability assessments, and a wide variety of relevant HN information. DOS is able to evaluate the effectiveness of its programs and predict future economic or humanitarian crises in a given country or region by this constant monitoring.

Examples of these reports include those written by the AMEMBASSY Political Officer, who monitors and reports on the personalities and effectiveness of a HN government; reports produced by the Economic officer, who monitors the HN economy; or by the Regional Security Officer (RSO), who works with HN police forces and reports on crime trends and terrorism threats. These types of reports closely monitor the elements that directly affect a HN’s stability and ultimately its sovereignty.

It is the less obvious examples of AMEMBASSY overseas programs that may benefit military commanders operating in Third World countries the most. For example, programs

managed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Director often focus on rural HN infrastructure and capacity building. One of USAID's programs, the African Food Security Initiative (AFSI), is investing in rural African roads in order to increase produce movement and develop immature markets. As part of this program, USAID teams travel to countries and conduct detailed studies of road networks to identify choke points and other limiting features. These reports are then studied to determine the most cost effective means of improving traffic flows. Although this type of report represents unprocessed information, it could still provide relevant information in the "Describe Battlespace Effects" step of JIPB.

The most significant aspect of these programs is that they can take place in countries with or without a U.S. recognized government. As illustrated earlier, the CIA and DIA have a relatively low resident presence in Africa. DIA's intelligence reporting is further restrained by DOD's force protection measures restricting Attachés from traveling to countries without recognized governments or deemed hostile to U.S. service members. These restraints often do not apply to other USG agencies that regularly travel to these same countries to manage developmental programs. For example, from 1996 to 2001, the USAID developmental aid to Somalia averaged over \$18 million a year; \$16 million has been requested for FY2002.<sup>17</sup> In monitoring these developmental programs, USAID personnel regularly travel to Somalia. U.S. DOD members have been restricted from traveling to Somalia since 1994.

This is just one example of the type of information available; there are many more. By their nature, all USG and International developmental program reports and findings can be accessed through open source means. In addition to these programs, internal

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<sup>17</sup> USAID, "Country Information: Somalia," November 2001, <[http://www.usaid.gov/regions/afr/so\\_assistance.html](http://www.usaid.gov/regions/afr/so_assistance.html)> [11 January 2002].

AMEMBASSY information can also be of use to military commanders. For example, Embassy Administrative Officers routinely keep on file detailed lists of general service vendors and contractors that have provided dependable service to the Embassy on past projects. These same vendors can be a valuable resource to commanders deploying Civil Affairs (CA), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), or general Special Operations Forces (SOF) to Third World countries for humanitarian assistance (HA) or other operations. AMEMBASSY personnel can have first hand knowledge of information relevant to commanders operating in their area. A list of key AMEMBASSY personnel by function area is listed in Appendix F.

In addition to information products available through USG agencies, many international agencies and NGOs now post their reports on websites accessible through unclassified Internet systems. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) maintains a comprehensive Internet home page that provides access to all UN products by country for example. Most organizations maintain their own website, but many can also be accessed through electronic “bulletin-boards” such as ReliefWeb.com. This website lists many of the international organizations and hot-links viewers directly to their products.

### Problems with the Solution

*Open-Source Legal Restrictions.* There are some military commanders, non-intelligence based USG agencies and NGOs that believe using non-vetted, open-source, information to fill military intelligence gaps is illegal according to Presidential Executive



Order 12333.<sup>18</sup> This is not correct. EO 12333 not only provides the legal basis for information sharing between USG agencies and departments, it directs it. Under EO 12333, specific operational guidance is outlined for the U.S. in regards to intelligence collection and dissemination. The direct relevance of EO 12333 to operational commanders regarding open source information is addressed under Part 1:

To the greatest extent possible consistent with applicable United States law and this Order, and with full consideration of the rights of United States persons, all agencies and departments should seek to ensure full and free exchange of information in order to derive maximum benefit from the United States intelligence effort.<sup>19</sup>

In addition to clearly defining information, the order provides specific directives to USG agencies on the collection and dissemination of information. The general reporting of USG agencies and departments can legally provide operational commanders with relevant and timely information. This information can bridge intelligence gaps identified in the JIPB process, resulting in more efficient military operations in Third World countries.

*Access to Non-DOD Information Products.* Although legally available to operational commanders, relevant non-intelligence community based information may be difficult to access. Restricted access may result from a number of reasons, but they are generally driven by one of two factors: the providing agency not wanting to be seen as an intelligence collection asset or the requester not knowing how to access the information.

While under the control of the American Ambassador, most non-intelligence USG agencies overseas rely on personal HN contacts to gain the access needed to facilitate their programs. While NGOs do not fall under direct control of American Ambassadors, they do rely on HN personal contacts to conduct their programs. If the HN contact perceives this

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<sup>18</sup> Executive Order 12333, dated 4 December 1981, is the Presidential Executive Order outlining the Goals, Direction, Duties, and Responsibilities with respect to the National Intelligence Effort and the conduct of Intelligence Activities.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., Part 1, 1.1, (d).

access is leading to U.S. intelligence collection, adverse actions could result. These actions could range from the HN simply denying the access, to the individuals being personae non-gratae from the country. In either case, the result may seriously jeopardize the NGO or AMEMBASSY's diplomatic position in the country and reduce their overall effectiveness. To avoid these unwanted consequences, commanders must not directly task non-DOD agencies and personnel with information collection. As previously discussed, the information from these organizations is often readily available through open source means or established command liaisons.

As demonstrated, open source information useful to military commanders exists, but access remains a problem. Embedded in CINC and JTF staffs are DOS liaisons such as a political advisor (POLAD) and political/military (POL/MIL) cells in their J5. These elements have counterparts within the DOS and other USG agencies. As discussed previously, some Third World U.S. Embassies have resident DIA or Security Assistance (SA) DOD officers. Despite these embedded positions, access to relevant non-DOD operational information remains a problem. Much of this access problem revolves around the "stove-piping" of RFIs. Commanders must break the intelligence paradigm of this established system to access open source information.

The education of operational staffs and liaison personnel is one method to assist commanders. These staffs, often over tasked and understaffed, tend to focus solely on DOD and intelligence community related products. By doing this, they have filtered out relevant information that may assist in conducting the JIPB. Commanders must dedicate cells or individual personnel to conduct open source information search. They can conduct this search either through direct liaison or via internet systems at the operational level. Staffs can

evaluate the relevance of the information in supporting the JIPB and discard that which is irrelevant by maintaining this effort at the operational level.

A commander bypasses layers of bureaucracy and establishes his own information conduit by establishing his own liaison with direct liaison authority (DIRLAUTH) in an AMEMBASSY. A liaison officer would interact directly with AMEMBASSY and USG principals. This allows increased information access and flow without tasking existing USG agencies with additional processing. The information obtained could be sent directly to the operational staff for evaluation and use in the JIPB. The end result is a more timely and complete intelligence product on which the commander can base his estimate.

## **CONCLUSION**

Post-Cold War reductions are a reality all operational commanders must face. As significant as the reduced force structure is the reduction in intelligence products. Nowhere is this point more poignant than in Third World countries. CIA and DIA capabilities have been sacrificed in these countries in order to shift limited assets to higher priority regions. The result is less processed intelligence for operational commanders.

Despite less focus on Third World countries, commanders are finding themselves increasingly operating in these places since 1990. Many Third World governments are destabilizing without the economic and political support the Cold War provided.

Commanders operating in these countries are faced with less than optimum intelligence estimates resulting in increased risk to the forces they command due to intelligence gaps.

There is a solution to reducing this risk. USG agencies and NGOs can provide relevant, open source, information to assist commanders in Third World military operations.

These organizations are an unexploited source of relevant information for specific JOAs in Third World countries. This relevant and timely, open source, information can legally be provided if operational commanders and staffs know how to access it.

This available information can assist operational commanders in filling the gaps identified in the JIPB process. A more thoroughly prepared intelligence estimate is produced, a more suitable course of action is selected, and a more efficient military operation is conducted by filling these gaps. The end result is reduced risk to our operating forces. All this is produced just by “filling the gaps.”

APPENDIX A:

UN Agencies and Main International NGOs in Somalia - 2001<sup>20</sup>

## APPENDIX B:

### U.S. Interests in Third World Countries<sup>21</sup>

- Regional Stability
- Access
- Information and Warning
- Safety of American Citizens
- Region Free of WMD
- Comity and Cooperation
- Region Free of Sponsors or Safe Havens for Transnational Threats
- Freedom of Egregious Suffering
- Regional Governance that is Humane, Managerially Competent, and Accountable
- Sustained Economic Development
- Unthreatened Natural Environment

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<sup>20</sup> Relief Web Map Centre, “UN Agencies and Main International NGOs in Somalia – 2001,” 9 March 2001, <[www.reliefweb.int/w/map.nsf/wPreview/A672136DDA1D478C85256AAA00654331?Opendocument](http://www.reliefweb.int/w/map.nsf/wPreview/A672136DDA1D478C85256AAA00654331?Opendocument)> [21 January 2002].

<sup>21</sup> Dan Henk, “UNCHARTERED PATHS, UNCERTAIN VISION: U.S. Military Involvements in Sub-Saharan Africa in the Wake of the Cold War,” (U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, 1997), 6.

## APPENDIX C:

### Military Operations in Africa Since 1990<sup>22</sup>

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>OPERATION NAME</u>	<u>ACTIVITY</u>
1990	SHARP EDGE	NEO from Liberia
1991	EASTERN EXIT QUICK LIFT	NEO from Somalia NEO from Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo)
1992	no operation name PROVIDE TRANSITION RESTORE HOPE PROVIDE RELIEF	NEO from Sierra Leone Election support in Angola Humanitarian Operations in Somalia Humanitarian Operations in Somalia
1994	DISTANT RUNNER SUPPORT HOPE	NEO from Rwanda Humanitarian Operations in Rwanda
1995	UNITED SHIELD	Support to UN withdrawal from Somalia
1996	QUICK RESPONSE ASSURED RESPONSE GUARDIAN ASSISTANCE	NEO from Central African Republic NEO from Liberia Humanitarian Operations, Central Africa
1997	GUARDIAN RETRIEVAL  NOBLE OBELISK ASSURED LIFT	Preparation for NEO from Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo) NEO from Sierra Leone ECOMOG support, Liberia
1998	RESOLUTE RESPONSE INFINITE REACH SHEPERD VENTURE	Africa Strike Operations: Sudan/Afghanistan NEO from Guinea-Bissau

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<sup>22</sup> Federation of American Scientists, Military Analysis Network, "United States Military Operations," 3 January 2002, <<http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/>> [5 January 2002].

	no operation name NOBLE RESPONSE	NEO from Eritrea Humanitarian Operations, Kenya
2000	ATLAS PROVIDER no operation name MONUC	Humanitarian Operations, Mozambique NEO from Sierra Leone UN PKO Democratic Republic of Congo
APPENDIX D:		

### The Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB)

The primary purpose of the JIPB is to support the commander's decision making and planning for a major operation or campaign by identifying, assessing, and estimating the adversary's center(s) of gravity, critical vulnerabilities, capabilities, limitations, intentions, and courses of action (COAs) that are most likely to encountered based on the situation. JIPB products help to provide the framework used by the joint force staff to develop friendly COAs and provide a foundation to the commander's decision regarding which friendly COA to adopt. Although JIPB support to decision making is both dynamic and continuous, it must be "front loaded" in the sense that the majority of analysis must be completed early enough to be factored into the commander's decision making effort.<sup>23</sup>

The JIPB is accomplished in a four step process, this process and the key elements of each are outlined below:<sup>24</sup>

- I. Define The Battlespace Environment.
  1. Identify the Area of Operations and the Area of Interest.
  2. Determine the Significant Characteristics of the Battlespace Environment.
  3. Evaluate Existing Data Bases and identify Intelligence Gaps and Priorities.
    - Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs).
    - Requests for Information (RFIs).
    - Production Requests (PRs).
    - Collection Requirements (CRs).
- II. Describe Battlespace Effects.
  1. Analyze Factor Space of the Battlefield Environment.
    - Military Geography (Land, Sea, Air), Demography, Politics, Diplomacy, Natural Resources, Economy, Agriculture, Transportation, Telecommunications, Culture, Ideology, Nationalism, Sociology, Science and Technology.
  2. Analyze Factor Time of the Battlespace Environment.
    - Preparation Time, Duration of Enemy Action, Warning Time, Decision Cycle, Planning Time, Time for Mobilization, Reaction Time, Time Required for Deployment, Deployment Transit Time,

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<sup>23</sup> "Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) NWC 4111D," (JMO Department, Naval War College, 13 November 2001), 1-12.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 1-13 to 1-37.



Time for Concentration, Time To Prepare And Complete Maneuver, Time to Accomplish the Mission, Rate of Advance (or Delay), Time for Bringing up Reinforcements, Time to Commit Reserves, Time to Regenerate Combat Power, Time for Redeployment, Time to Reconstitute Forces.

APPENDIX D (Continued):

3. Determine the Battlespace Effects on Enemy and Friendly Capabilities and Broad Coursed of Action (COAs).
- III. Evaluate The Enemy (Factor Forces).
  1. Enemy Centers of Gravity.
    - Defense Systems, Armed Forces, Relative Combat Power of Opposing Forces, Logistics, Combat Efficiency.
  2. Defend, Reinforce, Attack, Withdraw, or Delay: “Draw-D”
    - Doctrinal Templates, Description of Enemy Tactics, Identification of High Value Targets (HVTs – the enemy commander requires).
  3. Determine the current enemy situation.
  4. Identify enemy capabilities.
- IV. Determine Enemy COAs (ECOAs)
  1. Identify the enemy’s likely objectives and desired end state.
  2. Identify friendly critical factors.
  3. Identify enemy critical factors/COGs/CVs/DPs.
  4. Identify the full set of ECOAs available to the enemy.
  5. Evaluate and prioritize each ECOA.
  6. Develop each ECOA in the amount of detail time allows.
  7. Identify initial collection requirements.

In outlining the JIPB process, it is easy to identify the areas where gaps could exist in Third World country intelligence. It is also easy to identify those areas of the process that could benefit from open source information to fill these identified gaps for the operational commander.

## APPENDIX E:

### African Countries Without a Resident Defense Attaché (30)<sup>25</sup>

- Algeria
- Benin
- Burkina Faso
- Burundi
- Cape Verde
- \*Central African Republic
- Comoros
- Djibouti
- Gabon
- Gambia
- Ghana
- \*Guinea-Bissau
- Lesotho
- Libya
- Madagascar
- Malawi
- Mali
- Mauritania
- Mauritius
- Namibia
- Niger
- \*Republic of the Congo
- Sao Tome
- Seychelles
- \*Sierra Leone
- \*Somalia
- \*Sudan
- Swaziland
- Togo
- Zambia

\* Countries where the U.S. has conducted military operations since 1990.

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<sup>25</sup> Foreign Area Officer Home Page, 15 January 2002, <<http://www-perscom.army.mil/opfamos/>>

## APPENDIX F:

### AMEMBASSY Personnel by Function Area<sup>26</sup>

(In Typical Third World Countries)

- Chief of Mission (Ambassador)	General and specific country and regional knowledge Oversees all AMEMBASSY functions
- Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM)	General and specific country and regional knowledge Oversees all AMEMBASSY operations
- Political Officer	Manages and reports on political related activities
- Economic Officer	Manages and reports on economic related activities
- Commercial	Manages and reports on commercial related activities
- Consulate Officer	Manages and reports on consulate activities
- Administrative Officer	Manages requirements related to the operation of the AMEMBASSY, includes management of General Service Operations (GSO)
- Information Management Officer	Manages requirements for AMEMBASSY (DOS) communications
- Regional Security Officer (RSO)	Manages and reports on security related activities for AMEMBASSY and U.S. citizens
- Defense Attaché	Manages and reports DIA related activities
- Chief of Station	Manages and reports CIA related activities

#### Other Agency Representation Often Present:

- USAID Director	Manages and reports on USAID related activities
- Environmental Officer	Manages and reports on environmental programs
- Refugee Coordinator	Manages and reports on refugee related activities
- Security Assistance Officer	Manages and reports on DSCA/FMS activities (Works for Regional CINC – not DIA)

#### Note:

Not all these agencies may be present in Third World American Embassies.

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[17 January 2002].

<sup>26</sup> Department of State, "Key Embassy Officials," 20 December 2001,  
<<http://www.usembassy.state.gov/posts/ar1/www0051.html>> [13 January 2002].

Often duties and responsibilities will be grouped under one position.  
Example: Economic/Commercial Officer is one person.

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